waraaqo sir ah oo la helay iyo khsaaraha somaliland ugu jira shirka london ka akhriso gudaha qoraalkaasi sirta ah oo engilish ku qoran

London (MaantaSomaliland):- Markaad akhrido sadexdan document ee ka soo baxay dadka qabanqaabinaya shirka London bal ii sheeg waxa Somaliland ugu jira. Somaliland waxa ay ka qaybgalaysaa iyadoo ah Gobalkii WGalbeed loo yaqaanay xilligii Siyaad Barre. Iyada oo aan wax talo ama soo jeedin ah ku lahayn shirka gabi ahaantii waayo go,aamada shirka ka soo bixi doonaa waa qaar hore loo sii gaadhay.

Dawlada ingriiskuna waa dabinkii la isla gartay in loo dhigo Somaliland. Shirkani waa Gumaysi Casri ah oo Soomaali dib loo Gumaysanayo Somalilandnimada meesha lagaga saarayo. Hadaba, ninka shirkan leh dan ayaa inoogu jirta waxa uu si badheedha u caayayaa Caqliga iyo Garaadka reer Somaliland.

Mohamed Abdirahman Gadhyare

Hargeisa Star

1. Warbixinta ama waraaqda Kowaad:

I.          BACKGROUND:

The United Kingdom government has recently announced a conference on the Situation in Somalia to be held on February 23, 2012 in London. Subsequently, certain statements were made by British officials to pave the way for the said conference. The British Foreign Secretary, William Hague, said: “Somalia poses significant threats to international security, as a base for terrorists and pirates who threaten the security and prosperity of people around the world.” Furthermore, British Prime Minister, David Cameron, issued a statement calling Somalia a “failed state that directly threatens British interests.”

It is imperative to underline three particular facts. First, threats that have been emanating from Somalia are currently in declining trend. Second, these threats are symptoms, not the core problems. Third, political instability and underdeveloped and mal-equipped security apparatus are the real problems.

The aforementioned statements stand in sharp contrast to the current situation in Somalia and do not seem to take into considerations recent development that occurred in the latter half of 2011. Despite the enormous and agonizing difficulties encountered mainly on the security front, Somalia has certainly been bouncing back from the dark security challenges of the past two decades, thanks to the extraordinary determination and perseverance of the Somali TFG and AMISOM forces.

Though sporadic armed clashes still occur, the TFG and AMISOM forces have defeated Al-shabaab and cleared them from the capital city. As a result, today the ordinary residents of Mogadishu are able to get around and resume their normal lives in safety and security once again. Moreover, recent visits by the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in August 2011 and the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in December 2011, demonstrate Mogadishu’s strides in security.

The Al-shabaab’s forces are now on the run and its reign of terror is precipitously withdrawing from many cities and districts under the coordinated joint military pressure. The process of eradicating Al-Shabaab is already underway, and the total liberation of the country from the clutches of Al-shabaab terrorism is soon to be a reality.

For the past year and half, the TFG faced the worst famine in Somalia in sixty years and with backing of the international community and our Turkish friends, we have made some progress in reaching those affected by the famine. This famine created new challenges and many TFG resources were diverted to tackling its consequences and ensuring effective delivery of aid.

Additionally, on the security front, Somalia has developed a comprehensive medium term National Security Stabilization Plan (NSSP) that outlines clearly benchmarks and responsibility for its implementation. The NSSP, which has been already passed by the TFG cabinet aims at stabilizing the country in the next three years 2011-2014.

II.   RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE LONDON CONFERENCE:

In our view, the recently announced February 23, 2012 UK government conference on the Situation in Somalia should build on recent TFG accomplishments and support a more lasting solution for Somalia. The agenda should not be limited to the issues of piracy and international security. Rather, it should include addressing the root causes of those security concerns. For the London Conference to be successful we are putting forth the following recommendations:

1- Reconciliation:

We believe that a military victory leading to a durable peace is unlikely. Therefore, we seek a comprehensive peace process that includes all stakeholders at all levels and has international guarantees.

a.       Primary focus should be on facilitating a Somali-led national all inclusive reconciliation effort.

b.      The British government should use its diplomatic and political weight in bringing Somaliland to the table; not as an observer, but as a partner in peace.

c.       Strategize ways to address the range of driving factors fueling the conflict in Somalia and help prevent recurring conflict.

2- Security:

a.       The only lasting solution to the complex security problem is to rebuild a credible Somali national army, police, and intelligence security force capable of guaranteeing Somalia’s internal security and territorial water.

b.      Lift the current UN arms embargo resolution to allow the Somali armed force import the required weaponry, mobility and military supplies that would enable their combat readiness to totally disrupt and defeat Al-shabaab and carry out their defensive mandate.

c.       Build a viable Somali navy and strengthen the Somali national coast guard with efficient operational capacity, training; armed and equipped with adequate weaponry, technology and supplies (i.e. adequate patrol boats, ships, radar and radios) that would allow them to protect our coastal and maritime security, including piracy, toxic waste dumping, illegal fishing, and armed robbery in the Somali coast.

d. Finalize the enlistment and training of the 30,000 troops; guarantee their continuous and incessant stipend payment and the refurbishing of troops’ barracks, headquarters and training facilities, so that the command and control of the army units is secured, troops are provided with adequate quarters; the routine trainings programs are regularly and frequently carried out. All this will come to the same cost as 12,000 AMISOM troops.

e.       Re-institute and revitalize the law enforcement agencies and their facilities, including the police stations in all urban centers, the custodial corps and court system. This to guarantee the competent fulfillment of law enforcement agencies responsibility.

f.        While monitoring continuously any financial transactions to and from Somalia is critical and taking actions against terrorist financing is key to defeating terrorist organization, we should also refrain from a wholesale halting of the Diaspora remittance, which is today (in the absence of the national financial institutions) the lifeline of the country.

3.         Financial Management:

a.       Create an independent Joint Financial Management Board presided by a former Head of State to ensure and monitor mutual accountability between Somalia and donors.

b.      Greater transparency and accountability on the financial management is required. Therefore, while developing and following the standard fiscal framework and improved budgetary process for the entire budget cycle is critical, it is likewise necessary to install internal financial control, accountability and reporting structures, as well as a parliamentary oversight of the budget process.

c.       To that end, to show more accountability and transparency, the TFG should open its books for auditing to the International community and likewise, the UNOS, UNDP, WFP, etc., should also open their books for auditing to account how and where they have devolved and spent the money earmarked for Somalia. Bi-monthly financial reports should be published.

III. CONCLUSION:

The timing of the United Kingdom’s conference on the situation in Somalia is critical. Consequently, while the British government and the International Community seek this opportunity to coordinate and improve their policy toward Somalia and bring about a lasting solution, we urge them to base their decisions on TFG’s recent accomplishments.

Second, as we recognize the AU countries’ brotherly sacrifices in blood and financial resources and their utmost role in enhancing security, which has certainly prevented our nation sovereignty to succumb under the pressure of the terrorist forces, we also believe that the only lasting solution to the complex security problem of our country and by in large to counter the piracy and terrorism question, is to rebuild a credible Somali security sector capable of guaranteeing the country’s law and order and internal security, secure good neighborhood, and provide a long-term deterrence to the issue of piracy and terrorism.

Notwithstanding the current difficulties, Somalia is striving to maintain its inalienable right as a sovereign state and territorial integrity; as such any attempt that would limit or denigrate its self-government will unnecessarily generate another dangerous cycle of conflict.

2. Warbixinta ama waraaqda Labaad:

Senior Officials Technical Meeting: Promoting Local Stability in Somalia.

11 January 2012

Abu Dhabi, UAE

Chair’s Summary

In advance of the London Conference on Somalia on 23 February, the UK chaired a senior officials technical meeting on 11 January in Abu Dhabi to discuss how best to promote local stability across Somalia. The UK is very grateful to the United Arab Emirates for hosting the meeting, and for their continued support to the London Conference on Somalia.

The Abu Dhabi meeting is one of several meetings that the UK is convening with Somali and international stakeholders in advance of the London Conference, to consult on the proposed agenda and the key areas for discussion. The meeting was attended by representatives of the London Conference core group[1].

The participants recognised the importance of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) and their successors for both local and national political reconciliation. It was also agreed that supporting existing and emerging local areas of stability in Somalia is a crucial part of building peace and security for the Somali people. The two tracks of supporting local (bottom-up) and national (top-down) stability should reinforce each other.

This agenda is important because:

(1)   Greater local stability can have immediate benefits for ordinary Somali men and women;

(2)   It is a key component of broadening support for the transition, reaching a national level political settlement and building a legitimate central authority in Mogadishu after August 2012;

(3)   There is an opportunity at the moment to build on recent military gains, and the growing commitment within Somalia to reconciliation and outreach.

There was also recognition that this approach carries risks. It could jeopardise a sustainable national level political settlement. Providing resources without informed analysis could create perverse incentives and accelerate the emergence of illegitimate, irresponsible and/or competing local administrations.

There was agreement that the Garowe Principles[2] were a significant step in the right direction.  They provide a useful guide to moving forward on various constitutional issues, including on local involvement in future national political arrangements, and they restate Somalis’ continuing commitment to federalism. Further consultation with wider Somali stakeholders will be needed on the Garowe Principles – notably on the nature of federalism – starting with the Garowe II meeting.

The discussion on current local interventions raised several important lessons learnt from existing work. Current programmes (such as the Joint Programme on Local Governance, and the Transition Initiatives for Stabilization programme) set out criteria for support to local areas (particularly communities and districts in more stable areas). These provide a useful framework for developing agreed principles for wider international engagement that could accommodate a range of entry levels (e.g. community, district, area-based).

On the basis of this discussion, it was agreed that it would be useful for the London Conference to endorse a set of principles of good practice on how the international community should support local stability in Somalia.

These principles could include the following:

i.            Access: The security situation in any area must allow development partners sufficient access to assess support needed, to provide it, and to monitor and evaluate implementation.

ii.            Ownership: Local communities should determine interventions, and play a role in implementation. This process should be managed in a way which increases the incentives for stability, by responding to local needs.

iii.            Inclusion: Adequate attention should be paid to which local people are involved in decision-making, in particular to give under-represented groups a say, and to bind in those who may otherwise have an interest in restarting conflict.

iv.            Flexibility: Interventions should be based on in-depth understanding of local circumstances, and tailored according to context. Where a full package of support is not initially appropriate, an incremental approach to providing assistance should be used (rather than waiting for ideal circumstances).

v.            Integration: Each region will require a differentiated approach that integrates political, security and development elements. Humanitarian aid should continue to be provided based solely on need, but issues around resettlement of refugees and IDPs also need to be factored in.

vi.            Transparency: Resources provided to local areas should be used and accounted for in a transparent manner. Costs of local stability work should be shared with local people through agreement on distribution of revenues.

vii.            Recognition of central authority: Local representatives should acknowledge the Transitional Federal Charter and related peace agreements, the role of the TFIs in Mogadishu, and the constitutional process.

viii.            Reconciliation: Local representatives should have a clear and demonstrable commitment to reconciliation between parties to the conflict in Somalia (including the TFIs).

ix.            Partnerships: Interventions should build and strengthen strategic partnerships between local institutions, civil society groups and the private sector, and between different Somali areas.

x.            Sustainability: Support should be provided in a way which will allow the continuation of benefits over time, including when external assistance ends. Building the capacity of local people and institutions to engage with political processes, deliver services and address threats will be a critical part of this.

xi.            Conflict sensitivity: When supporting new areas which have the potential for local legitimacy but lack widespread recognition in Somalia, the principle of “do no harm” should be a priority.

These principles will be developed further to form the basis for further engagement with a wider group of Somali and international stakeholders. They should take account of previous work led by the UN on such principles.

It was agreed that Somalis themselves need to agree the principles of what local stability means in practice across the country, and manage the delivery of it. The new constitution should create the broader political vision within which this can be worked out. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and its successor should prepare and maintain an overall strategic framework for supporting local stability.

There was acceptance that bringing local parties on board often takes time, but that this process is important in reducing the potential for conflict. However, when interventions begin they need to show clear and immediate benefits for local people. Further discussion is required on how to balance taking advantage of new opportunities to work in previously insecure areas as quickly as possible (e.g. through quick impact projects), with due caution in not rushing in too quickly in contravention of best practice.

It was agreed that dialogue could start with clan and other community leaders in areas where it is not yet possible for the international community to provide support due to insecurity, and that the international community should encourage the TFG and other Roadmap signatories to engage in such dialogue.

Participants discussed ways in which support to local stability could be financed and coordinated. There was agreement that current coordination arrangements were not adequate, and would become even less so if the amount of support increased. Better coordination was needed to improve coherence and efficiency in the provision of assistance. Participants also agreed that there was a need for better information sharing on existing and future work promoting local stability.

How coordination should be organised in future will need to be looked at in the context of wider work on revitalising international coordination on Somalia, which is one of the themes of the London Conference. Participants agreed that the TFG would need to be involved in coordinating this work, and that this should be through Roadmap structures in the short-term. This should also allow the contributions and interests of countries in the region to be taken into account.

Some participants expressed interest in a local stability fund, if it could be designed to respond in a fast and flexible way to emerging needs, and complement other delivery mechanisms. Others questioned whether an additional funding mechanism was really needed, and whether existing mechanisms could be adapted. It was agreed that further work was needed in the next two weeks on whether an announcement could be made on a local stability fund at the London Conference. The UK will circulate a more detailed proposal w/b 23 January.

The UK and other participants will consult further on these ideas during January and February with the TFIs, other relevant Somalis (including local representatives, and civil society organisations), and other countries and institutions attending the London Conference.

[2] Agreed on 24 December 2011 by the Roadmap signatories

3. Warbixinta ama waraaqda Saddexaad:

Draft Italian “food for thoughts” to end the Somali transition

Italian “Non Paper” to end the Somali transition

January 1st, 2012

The 2009 Djibouti peace process failed to become the milestone for a sound reconciliation and stabilization process. The continuous internal struggle in the TFIs has not been solved by the Kampala Agreement while the degree of implementation of the “roadmap”, agreed upon in the consultative meeting held in Mogadishu last September 2011, is likely to be much unsatisfactory at the important deadline represented by 20th August 2012. In the meanwhile, the first large scale famine of the XXI century is provoking a humanitarian catastrophe.

It is time for the International Community to abandon the “containment” policy, focused on damage limitation control, and adopt a comprehensive strategy aimed at re-activating an effective process of outreach and inclusive involvement at local and tribal level, in order to restore a viable sovereignty in a federal/con-federal Somalia in peace with its neighbors. There is an urgent need to launch a broad political process, a sustained attempt at reconciliation by singling out and empowering only those Somali representatives – regional, local, civil society, religious and community leaders – that are legitimate, able and willing to engage in a process towards a political system based on the rule of law, whose results they have enough power to preserve and strengthen.

A truly comprehensive approach is needed from the key international partners of Somalia. The EU has recently offered a meaningful contribution in this direction through its Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa. The other main stakeholders are invited to provide similar far-reaching platforms to give new substance to the international commitment for a credible and inclusive constitutional process for the stabilization of Somalia.

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The Somali “transition” is not to be extended anymore. On 21st August 2012 the TFIs are to be temporarily substituted by a UN/AU International Administration, which should ensure, until 31st December 2013, the administration of the territory where the TFIs are at present exerting sovereignty: mainly Mogadishu. The Security Council of the United Nations thus establishes a temporarily administration (from 21/8/2012 to 31/12/2013) led by a Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia, appointed also as United Nations Secretary General’s Special Representative for Somalia, then becoming the Joint UN/AU Special Representative for Somalia (JSR).

The JSR, selected preferably among former African Heads of Government or State, will have a twin mandate:

Administering Mogadishu: by strengthening security, providing basic services to the population, ensuring the access and correct distribution of humanitarian aid and by launching early-recovery projects.

In order to administer Mogadishu and the territories that will be gradually gained by AMISOM, the JSR is assisted by an Interim Authority, of no more than 15 members. The Interim Authority is a cabinet composed for two thirds by Somali experts and for one third by international experts , to be appointed by a core group of international stakeholders [see point 2)A] . Somali members will be appointed respecting the 4,5 formula and the PM will be a Somali, from a minority clan.

During the period of the Interim Authority, the JSR, in close coordination with the core group, exercises control over resources through a Joint Financial Management Board/JFMB. The Interim Authority will have the power of spending proposal on 60% of financial disbursements, while the JSR on 40%;

Transferring power to new Somali Authorities: the JSR, assisted by his/her political advisors [see point 2)B], starts immediately consultations with the main Somali stakeholders in order to convene preferably before 31 December 2012, a Constituent Assembly, of no more than 100 delegates, in charge of drafting and approving the Somali Constitution, thus laying the ground for the transfer of power to new Somali authorities, becoming operational on the 1st January 2014.

The Somali representatives engaged in the JSR-led consultations held exclusively in the Somali territory will include Somaliland, Puntland, Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a, the Major of Mogadishu and the former President, Speaker and Prime Minister of the TFIs. Prominent businessmen and representatives from major IDPs and refugee camps will also be engaged.

At least one representative from all the 18 administrative regions (as defined by the Somali State in 1990) is given a seat in the Assembly, including those originating from the administrations freed from Shabaab’s control by the ongoing military operations in south-central Somalia. Each administrative region will have no more than 6 representatives.

Those Shabaab’s leaders not linked to international jihadism will be offered the perspective of engagement in the new political process. For this reason, an incremental approach is adopted: the seats of the Constituent Assembly assigned to regions under Shabaab ‘s control are not be occupied at this stage.

1) This new approach will ensure that:

A. While the UN/AU International Administration rules on the epicenter of the Somali civil war, Mogadishu, a new political process will outreach to more legitimate and effective Somali representatives, so far excluded or only partially engaged;

B. As soon as the composition of a Constituent Assembly is agreed upon, Somalis will be given the opportunity to define their issues and their future institutional settlement independently (centralized, federation, confederation or Custom Union);

C. A strengthened military presence of AMISOM in Mogadishu, along the lines of the new AU-UN strategic concept, will ensure that the end of the transition would not turn into an increase of warlordism in the capital and will reduce impunity for internal “spoilers”;

D. The bold political mandate of the JSR will help reducing regional meddling in Somali affairs;

E. The presence of AMISOM and the authority of the JSR will also represent a confidence-building measure for all Somali stakeholders;

F. The strong political mandate of the JSR will enhance the coherence, quality and impact of International efforts in the fight against terrorism and piracy, scourges which are also nourished by chronic instability, ineffective State institutions and the absence or weakness of the rule of law.

2) For the UN/AU International Administration to be effective the following conditions are necessary:

A. The JSR to chair and be supported by a core group of international stakeholders (no more than 5 actors such as United States, Turkey, European Union, IGAD and the Gulf Cooperation Council). The main task of the core group being to exercise control over resources through the JFMB ;

B. The establishment of a small team of 6 international Political Advisors (1 from a IGAD Country, 2 from EU Countries, 1 from United States, 2 from OIC Countries), its main task being to assist the JSR in the consultations with the main Somali stakeholders in view of appointing, preferably before 31 December 2012, the Constituent Assembly;

C. The International Community to increase its assistance, both financial and technical (e.g. through detachment of experts) to the military and civilian components of AMISOM.

In this respect, it is of the utmost importance that, without affecting the African leadership and ownership of the stabilization process, the EU upgrade as soon as possible its support and capacity building contributions through its already established (Atalanta and EUTM) or future (RMCB) CSDP operations and missions.

D. All international efforts in stabilizing Somalia to be coordinated by the JSR;

E. The Kenyan and Ethiopian military units currently operating in south-central Somalia immediately re-hatted in AMISOM in order to ensure that they fall under the JSR’s chain of command;

F. A new effort to be made in engaging Somali Islamist groups which renounce to international terrorism and ensure unhindered humanitarian access. At this regard, precise political conditions are to be identified for the removal from international sanctions list of some political figures which could play an important role in stabilizing south-central Somalia. The strengthening of political Islam could undermine Shabaab’s unity and prove the possibility of a non-military political arena.

G. UN Agencies based in Nairobi to be transferred without delay to Mogadishu and, on the 21st August 2012, the mandate of UNPOS reconsidered.